Baba Metsia 11a — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 📖 Mishna we derive the halakha with regard to acquiring a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, and one S…

we derive the halakha with regard to acquiring a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, and one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that we do not derive the halakha with regard to a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce. And if you wish, say instead that with regard to a minor girl, everyone agrees that we derive the halakha with regard to a found item from the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, and she acquires an ownerless item that is found in her courtyard. And here they disagree with regard to whether a minor boy acquires an item that is placed in his courtyard. One Sage, Rabbi Yannai, holds that we derive the halakha with regard to a minor boy from the halakha with regard to a minor girl, as there should be no difference between them with regard to the halakhot of acquisition. And one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that we do not derive the halakha with regard to a minor boy from the halakha with regard to a minor girl; only a minor girl acquires items by means of her courtyard, as the Torah includes this mode of acquisition with regard to acquiring a bill of divorce. And if you wish, say instead that there is no dispute here at all. Rather, one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, said one statement, that a minor girl is divorced by her husband placing a bill of divorce in her courtyard, and one Sage, Rabbi Yannai, said another statement, that a minor boy or girl does not acquire an item that is found in his or her courtyard; and they do not disagree. If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, e.g., after a deer crippled by a broken leg, or after young pigeons that have not yet learned to fly, which can be caught easily, and he said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. If the deer were running in its usual manner, or the young pigeons were flying, and he said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, he has said nothing, as one’s courtyard cannot effect acquisition of an item that does not remain there on its own.

▶ 💬 Guemara Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: And this acquisition mentioned in the mishna is effective specifically in a case where…

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: And this acquisition mentioned in the mishna is effective specifically in a case where the owner is standing next to his field at the time of the acquisition, so that it has the halakhic status of a secured courtyard. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But shouldn’t his field effect acquisition of the animal for him even without him standing next to it? As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: A person’s courtyard effects acquisition of property for him even without his knowledge. The Gemara answers: This statement applies only to a secured courtyard, where items remain in the courtyard without supervision. But with regard to an unsecured courtyard, if the owner is standing next to his field, yes, it effects acquisition of ownerless items on his behalf, but if he is not, it does not effect acquisition of items on his behalf. The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that in the case of an unsecured courtyard, if the owner is standing next to his field, yes, it effects acquisition of ownerless items on his behalf, but if he is not, it does not effect acquisition of items on his behalf? As it is taught in a baraita: There is a case where a landowner was standing in the town and saying: I know that my laborers forgot a sheaf that I have in the field, which I had intended for the laborers to bring in, but since I remember it, it shall not be considered a forgotten sheaf, which must be left for the poor. Then, the landowner himself forgot about the sheaf. In this case, one might have thought that it is not considered a forgotten sheaf. To counter this, the verse states: “When you reap your harvest in your field, and have forgotten a sheaf in the field, you shall not go back to fetch it; it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow” (Deuteronomy 24:19). It is derived from here that the phrase: “And have forgotten” applies “in the field,” but not in the town. The Gemara clarifies: This baraita itself is difficult. First you said that one might have thought that it is not considered a forgotten sheaf, so apparently the tanna seeks to prove that it is considered a forgotten sheaf. And then the baraita adduces the derivation that the phrase “and have forgotten” applies only “in the field,” but not in the town, which apparently means that a sheaf forgotten by the owner while he is in the town is not considered a forgotten sheaf. Rather, isn’t this what the tanna is saying: In a case where the owner is in the field, if the sheaf was forgotten at the outset, it is considered a forgotten sheaf; but if it was remembered at first and was ultimately forgotten, it does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf? What is the reason for this distinction? The reason is that since he is standing in the field, beside the sheaf, his field is tantamount to his courtyard, and his courtyard effects acquisition of the sheaf for him once he remembers it. But in a case where the owner is in the town, even if the sheaf was remembered and ultimately forgotten, it is considered a forgotten sheaf and must be left for the poor. What is the reason for this? It is because the owner is not beside it, which is necessary for his courtyard to effect acquisition of the sheaf for him. Evidently, an item that is in a person’s courtyard is acquired by him only if he is standing next to the courtyard. The Gemara rejects this proof: From where can it be proven that this is the reason? Perhaps the baraita should be understood in a different manner: It is a Torah edict that if the owner is in the field, it is considered a forgotten sheaf, but if the owner is in the town, it is not considered a forgotten sheaf and does not need to be left for the poor. Accordingly, the distinction would not be derived from the halakhot of acquisition. The Gemara responds that the verse states: “You shall not go back to take it” (Deuteronomy 24:19), which is interpreted to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town. Evidently, there is no fundamental difference between a town and the field with regard to the halakhot of forgotten sheaves; rather, the distinction is due to the fact that one cannot acquire a sheaf by means of his courtyard if he is not standing next to the courtyard. The Gemara challenges: This phrase is necessary to impose a prohibition upon one who takes his sheaf after he forgot it, instead of leaving it for the poor. It is therefore not superfluous and cannot be interpreted as including an additional case. The Gemara answers: If so, if the verse serves only that purpose, let the verse say: You shall not take it. What is added by the phrase: “You shall not go back to take it”? It is written to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town. The Gemara challenges: But the phrase “you shall not go back” is still necessary for that which we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 7:4): While a landowner collects the sheaves from his field, any sheaf that remains before him, as he has not reached it yet, does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf, even if he has forgotten about its existence. Any sheaf that is already behind him has the status of a forgotten sheaf, as the prohibition of: You shall not go back, applies. This is the principle: Any sheaf to which the prohibition of: You shall not go back, applies, as one would need to retrace his steps in order to retrieve the sheaf, assumes the status of a forgotten sheaf; and any sheaf to which the prohibition of: You shall not go back, does not apply, i.e., a sheaf that one has yet to reach, does not assume the status of a forgotten sheaf. The phrase “You shall not go back” is apparently necessary to teach this halakha, and it cannot be interpreted as including a case where the owner is in the town. Rav Ashi said that the inclusion of this case is derived from another phrase in the verse. The verse states: “It shall be” (Deuteronomy 24:19), which is interpreted to include sheaves forgotten while the owner is in the town. Therefore, the Gemara’s initial interpretation of the baraita is accepted, leading to the conclusion that the distinction between a case where the owner is in the field and a case where he is in the town is due to the halakha that one’s courtyard can effect acquisition of property for him only if he is next to the courtyard, as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel. And Ulla also says that the acquisition mentioned in the mishna is effective specifically in a case where the owner is standing next to his field. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana also says that the acquisition is effective specifically in a case where he is standing next to his field. Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla from that which is taught in a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 5:9): There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel and other Elders, who were traveling on a ship. Since he remembered that he had not tithed the produce of his fields, Rabban Gamliel said to the others: One-tenth of my produce, which I will measure out in the future and separate from my produce, is given to Yehoshua ben Ḥananya, who is a Levite and is entitled to receive the first tithe,

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français Rav Yehouda dit que Shmuel dit : Et cette acquisition mentionnée dans la mishna n’est effective que dans un cas où le pr…

Rav Yehouda dit que Shmuel dit : Et cette acquisition mentionnée dans la mishna n’est effective que dans un cas où le propriétaire est debout à côté de son champ au moment de l’acquisition, de sorte qu’elle a le statut halakhique d’une cour sécurisée. La Guemara soulève une difficulté : Mais son champ ne devrait-il pas effectuer l’acquisition de l’animal pour lui même sans qu’il soit debout à côté ? Comme Rabbi Yosseï, fils de Rabbi Ḥanina, dit : La cour d’une personne effectue l’acquisition d’un bien pour elle même sans sa connaissance. La Guemara répond : Cette déclaration ne s’applique que à une cour sécurisée, où les objets restent dans la cour sans surveillance. Mais en ce qui concerne une cour non sécurisée, si le propriétaire est debout à côté de son champ, oui, elle effectue l’acquisition d’objets sans propriétaire en son nom, mais si il ne l’est pas, elle n’effectue pas l’acquisition d’objets en son nom. La Guemara demande : Et d’où dites-vous que dans le cas d’une cour non sécurisée, si le propriétaire est debout à côté de son champ, oui, elle effectue l’acquisition d’objets sans propriétaire en son nom, mais si il ne l’est pas, elle n’effectue pas l’acquisition d’objets en son nom ? Comme il est enseigné dans une baraita : Il y a un cas où un propriétaire terrien était debout dans la ville et disait : Je sais que mes ouvriers ont oublié une gerbe que j’ai dans le champ, que j’avais destinée à ce que les ouvriers la rapportent, mais puisque je m’en souviens, elle ne sera pas considérée comme une gerbe oubliée, qui doit être laissée aux pauvres. Ensuite, le propriétaire terrien lui-même oublia la gerbe. Dans ce cas, on aurait pu penser qu’elle n’est pas considérée comme une gerbe oubliée. Pour contrer cela, le verset dit : « Quand tu moissonneras ta moisson dans ton champ, et que tu auras oublié une gerbe dans le champ, tu ne retourneras point la prendre ; elle sera pour l’étranger, pour l’orphelin et pour la veuve » (Deutéronome 24:19). On en déduit que l’expression : « Et que tu auras oublié » s’applique « dans le champ », mais pas dans la ville. La Guemara clarifie : Cette baraita elle-même est difficile. D’abord vous avez dit qu’on aurait pu penser qu’elle n’est pas considérée comme une gerbe oubliée, donc apparemment le tanna cherche à prouver qu’elle est considérée comme une gerbe oubliée. Et ensuite la baraita apporte la dérivation que l’expression « et que tu auras oublié » ne s’applique que « dans le champ », mais pas dans la ville, ce qui apparemment signifie qu’une gerbe oubliée par le propriétaire alors qu’il est dans la ville n’est pas considérée comme une gerbe oubliée. Plutôt, n’est-ce pas ce que le tanna dit : Dans un cas où le propriétaire est dans le champ, si la gerbe a été oubliée dès le début, elle est considérée comme une gerbe oubliée ; mais si elle a été rappelée d’abord et a été finalement oubliée, elle ne prend pas le statut de gerbe oubliée ? Quelle est la raison de cette distinction ? La raison est que puisqu’il est debout dans le champ, à côté de la gerbe, son champ est équivalent à sa cour, et sa cour effectue l’acquisition de la gerbe pour lui dès qu’il s’en souvient. Mais dans un cas où le propriétaire est dans la ville, même si la gerbe a été rappelée et finalement oubliée, elle est considérée comme une gerbe oubliée et doit être laissée aux pauvres. Quelle est la raison de cela ? C’est parce que le propriétaire n’est pas à côté d’elle, ce qui est nécessaire pour que sa cour effectue l’acquisition de la gerbe pour lui. Évidemment, un objet qui se trouve dans la cour d’une personne n’est acquis par elle que si elle est debout à côté de la cour. La Guemara rejette cette preuve : D’où peut-on prouver que c’est la raison ? Peut-être la baraita doit-elle être comprise d’une manière différente : C’est un décret de la Torah que si le propriétaire est dans le champ, elle est considérée comme une gerbe oubliée, mais si le propriétaire est dans la ville, elle n’est pas considérée comme une gerbe oubliée et n’a pas besoin d’être laissée aux pauvres. En conséquence, la distinction ne serait pas dérivée des halakhot d’acquisition. La Guemara répond que le verset dit : « Tu ne retourneras point la prendre » (Deutéronome 24:19), qui est interprété pour inclure les gerbes oubliées alors que le propriétaire est dans la ville. Évidemment, il n’y a pas de différence fondamentale entre une ville et le champ en ce qui concerne les halakhot des gerbes oubliées ; plutôt, la distinction est due au fait qu’on ne peut pas acquérir une gerbe au moyen de sa cour s’il n’est pas debout à côté de la cour. La Guemara conteste : Cette expression est nécessaire pour imposer une interdiction à celui qui prend sa gerbe après l’avoir oubliée, au lieu de la laisser aux pauvres. Elle n’est donc pas superflue et ne peut pas être interprétée comme incluant un cas supplémentaire. La Guemara répond : Si c’est le cas, si le verset ne sert qu’à ce but, que le verset dise : Tu ne la prendras point. Qu’est-ce qui est ajouté par l’expression : « Tu ne retourneras point la prendre » ? Elle est écrite pour inclure les gerbes oubliées alors que le propriétaire est dans la ville. La Guemara conteste : Mais l’expression « tu ne retourneras point » est encore nécessaire pour ce que nous avons appris dans une mishna (Pe’a 7:4) : Pendant qu’un propriétaire terrien ramasse les gerbes de son champ, toute gerbe qui reste devant lui, puisqu’il ne l’a pas encore atteinte, ne prend pas le statut de gerbe oubliée, même s’il a oublié son existence. Toute gerbe qui est déjà derrière lui a le statut de gerbe oubliée [...]

📜 Baba Metsia — 11a

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